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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CURTESY-ITS ABOLITION IN MISSOURI.
Law may be studied from either the analytical or historical
viewpoint. The analytical school with such advocates as Aus-
tin and Bentham goes back of any law or laws and studies
human legal relationships while the historical School with such
supporters as Maine and Savigny is interested primarily in
the history or evolution of law. Savigny says, "Law is not
isolated but is connected with human relations." The idea
embraced within this statement; has received mrked expres-
sion during the last two years in the changes that have been
made in the law of both State and nation. This is indeed true
of measures passed at the last regular session of the Missouri
Legislature. Certain of these are the so-called "Women's
bills, "concrete examples of the evolution of law. The Missouri
Legislature in the passage of these measures was not, how-
ever, taking unprecedented action, for similar statutes, com-
monly called Married Women's Acts, have been enacted in
most, if not all, of the States. The statutes differ, but they all
attempt to enlarge the rights of married women in respect to
real estate. It was perhaps the expression of a desire to equal-
ize the property rights of men and women which caused the
Missouri Legislature at its regular session to pass a law abol-
ishing the husband's curtesy and giving him dower instead.
For purposes of comparison it is well to consider the view
taken by other leading American States upon the right of
curtesy.
In New York, by virtue of the passage of an act for the
protection of married women, the husband has no estate or
interest or right whatever, absolute or conditional, except
that on the death of the wife, after issue born, the husband
has an estate for life as tenant by the curtesy. In Pennsyl-
vania the husband has his right of curtesy, although there
shall be no issue of the mhrriage, in all eases where the issue,
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if any, would have inherited. The act passed by Massachu-
setts, abolishing curtesy at common law, gives the husband
the right, upon the death of his wife, to hold for his life one-
third of all land owned by her at any time during coverture.
Closely following this view is the statute of Illinois which pro-
vides that the estate of curtesy is abolished and the surviving
husband or wife is endowed with one-third part of all the lands
of which the deceased husband or wife was seized. In those
States whose reports are contained in the Southwestern Re-
porter, Texas, Kentucky, and Missouri have abolished the
right of curtesy and given dower instead. The common law
right of curtesy prevails in Tennessee, but during the life of
the wife this estate is not subject to the debts of the husband
nor can it be alienated without the consent of the wife. The
Arkansas Constitution of 1874 abolished estates by curtesy
initiate and left only the possibility of an estate by curtesy
consummate.
The statutes above mentioned as well as similar ones in
and not retrospective. Thus if a particular estate by the
other States have practically all been held to be prospective
curtesy initiate had vested at the time of an enactment, it is
held that that estate is not divested by the statute even though
future estates by the curtesy initiate are abolished. This in-
terpretation seems to be based on the theory that the Legis-
lature has no power and, therefore, never intended to divest
vested estates.1
Practically all of the statutes which have been passed af-
fecting man's curtesy right prohibit the sale by the husband
of his estate by the curtesy initiate without the consent of his
wife, and protect the property from levy and sale to pay the
debts of the husband. Decisions are not uniform as to the
effect of those statutes upon the husband's estate by the cur-
tesy initiate, but they fall into three classes:
1. Mitchell v. Violett, 104 Ken. 77; Jackson v. Jackson, 144 111. 274;
Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 509; Denny v. McCabe, Za Ohio St. 576.
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1 They abolish curtesy initiate but not consummate.
2. They abolish curtesy consummate; hence, initiate.
3. They abolish neither, but increase women's and de-
crease men's rights.
Ajudicated cases in New York, Arkansas and Delaware
seem to support Class 1. That is to say, that curtesy initiate
is abolished but curtesy consummate is not. In a New York
case the Court said: "Since the acts allowing married women
to sell and devise their lands, a husband's right as tenant by
the curtesy initiate, as to the lands acquired since the passage
of those acts, consists simply of a status, which is never a
vested right, and is not separately alienable during coverture,
but may be modified or annulled by the death of the wife." 2
The view taken in Michigan, Colorado and Illinois of
statutes similar to those mentioned seems to be that they
abolish curtesy consummate, therefore initiate, as mentioned
in Class 2. In a Michigan case the Court says: "That the
wife shall have full and absolute control of her real and per-
sonal estate with power to contract, sell, transfer, mortgage,
convey, devise, and bequeath the same in the same manner
and with the like effect as if she were unmarried." In a
Colorado case the Court says: "It has long been settled by
repeated decisions of our courts, that under our laws the hus-
band has no vested right, inchoate or otherwise, by reason
of the marital relation, in the property belonging to his wife,
and that she holds an absolute legal estate in her real and
personal property, whether owned at time of marriage or ac-
quired during coverture, as free from any common law right
of her husband as if unmarried. As to her separate estate
she has no husband." The Act in Illinois to revise the laws
in relation to dower expressly provides that the estate by
curtesy is hereby abolished and the surviving husband or wife
2. Hurd v. Cass. 9 Barb. 336: Lloyd v. Planter'a Mutual Insurance
Co. Ass'n. 80 Ark. 486; Hampton v. Cook, 64 Ark. 353; Albany Co. Say.
Bank v. McCarty, 149 N. Y. 7L
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shall be endowed with the third part of all lands whereof the
deceased husband or wife was seized.
3
Cases from Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, and Mis-
sissippi seem to support the view stated, supra, as Class 3,
viz., that statutes such as those under consideration abolish
neither curtesy initiate nor consummate but that they increase
women's and decrease men's rights. An Act to secure the
rights of married women was passed in the Commonwealth of
North Carolina April 11, 1848. It provided that the property
of a married woman should not be subjected to execution for
any debt against her husband, or on account of any interest he
may have, or may have had therein, as tenant by the curtesy,
but the same shall be exempted from leVy and sale during the
life of said wife. In Maryland a decision based upon a statute
passed in 1841 held that no real estate hereafter acquired by
marriage 4hall be liable to execution during the life of the
wife for debts due by her husband. An Indiana case holds
that by statute no real estate whereof any married woman
was or may be seized or otherwise entitled to at the time of
her marriage, or which she has or "may fairly acquire during
her coverture, or any interest therein, shall be liable for the
debts of her husband, but the same and all interests therein.
and all rents and profits arising therefrom, shal be deemed
and taken to be her separate property, free and clear from
any and all claims of the creditors or legal representatives of
her husband, as fully as if she had never married; but that
the statute should not be so construed as to aply to debts con-
tracted by such married woman before marriage, and in all
such cases her said property shall be first liable therefor.
Statutes very similar to those quoted above have been held
to merely prevent the vesting of an estate in the husband until
the death of the wife, and in this way her estate is protected,
3. Hathcn Y. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong v. Marim, 15 Mich. 60; Brown
v. Clark, 44 Mich. 309; Deutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543; Knight v.
Lawrence, 19 Colo. 425; Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367; Jackson v. Jackson,
144 Il. 27
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but it is said that estates by curtesy initiate are not abolished
but merely made contingent, instead of vested estates.'
Taking up, now, more specifically the subject of curtesy
in Missouri it is found that when the land located within the
Louisiana Purchase was transferred from France to the
United States the law of Spain prevailed within that territory.
And previous to the Territorial Act of July 4, 1807, the Span-
ish Law of Community existed in the territory of Missouri.
By this law the husband and wife became partners in all es-
tates, real and personal, which they respectively possessed.
All property subsequently acquired by them was considered
as the fruits of their joint industry and went into the partner-
ship. On the dissolution of the partnership by death the sur-
viving party and the representatives of the deceased each took
back what was brought on his or her side into the partner-
ship in value of personal estate, in kind of real estate, and
what remained, considered as profits, was divided equally.
By the Territorial Act of July 4, 1807, the Spanish Law of
Community was abolished and the wife was given dower in
lieu of her interest under the Spanish Law. As a tenancy by
the curtesy is recognized by the same act, it must be intended
that the husband's right in the community was taken away
at the same time and the curtesy given as a part equivalent
for it.5 In the year 1816 the common law of England and all
the statutes of the British Parliament in aid of, or to suppl)
defects of the common law made prior to the 4th year of James
1st, of a general nature and not local to that kingdom and nol
contrary to the laws of this territory nor repugnant to nor in
consistent with the constitution or the laws of the United
States, was adopted by the Territorial Assembly as the rule
of decision in Missouri, until altered.6 From the statement
4. Anderson v. Tydings, 8 Md. 427; Junction Co. v. Harris, 9 Ind. 185;
Steward v. Ross, 50 Miss. 776; Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 849.
5. Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 519.
6. LindelI v. McNair, 4 Mo. 380.
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supra, it is seen that a study of curtesy must be made as it
existed at common law.
Under the common law an estate by the curtesy is a free
hold estate limited by operation of law to the husband for life
in the lands and tenements of the wife, of which she was seized
of an estate of inheritance during coverture. T The requisites
of such an estate are: 1. Lawful marriage; 2. Seisin of
wife during coverture; 3. Birth of living child during life-
time of wife; 4. Death of the wife. Provided the requisites
are fulfilled the estate of curtesy becomes initiate upon the
birth of issue, born alive and capable of inheriting, and con-
summate at death of wife. The seisin of wife during coverture
may be either in law or fact.$ The necessity for birth of issue
is set out in Richter v. Bohusack, cited below.0 Curtesy at-
taches to equitable estetes as well as freehold estates.10 The
case of Robinson v. Lakenan, cited below, holds that a hus-
band has curtesy in an equity of redemption, and by execut-
ing a deed of trust with his wife conveying his wife's property
he releases his right of curtesy only as against the trustees
therein and those claiming under them. 1 A husband is not
entitled to curtesy in lands of which his wife is reversioner,
when she dies before the termination of the precedent es-
state. 12 A deed granting to a married woman, to her sole
and separate use "free and clear of any aud all marital rights
of her present or any husband she may have hereafter," ex-
cludes a husband's right of curtesy in the land.'8 By virtue
of R. S. Mo. 1909, Sections 8304 and 8309, it is held that a
married woman during coverture may convey her separate
7. Tledeman on Real Property, p. 92.
8. Martin v. Trail. 142 Mo. p. 95; Harvey v. W lckham. 23 Mo. 112;
Stephens v. Hume. 25 Mo. 349.
9. Richter v. Bohusack, 144 Mo. 516.
10. Alexander V. Warrance, 17 Mo. 228; Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo.
265.
11. Robinson v. Lakenan, 29 Mo. App. 135.
12. Martin v. Trail, 142 Mo. 85.
13. McBreen v. McBreen, 15f Mo. 323.
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e8tate without her husband joining therein and that this
defeats the right of the husband to curtesy in such property
after the wife's death. 14 Statutory modification made by Rev.
Code, 1825, p. 216, Sec. 4, converting estates tail into a life
estate in the first taker with remainder over, of course, de-
prived the surviving spouse of the first taker of curtesy or
dower, as the case might be.' 5 During the coverture the hus-
band's estate of curtesy cannot be sold for his debts in Mis-
souri.' With reference to how this estate may be defeated, it
is found that a husband and wife may contract for the relin-
quishment of the husband's curtesy right in the wife's prop-
erty."1 Sec. 1809, R. S. Mo. 1919, provides that in all cases
of divorce from the bonds of matrimony the guilty party shall
forfeit all rights and claims under and by virtue of marriage.
In view of this statute a divorce granted for the fault of the
husband would be a bar to his taking curtesy.
The foregoing is a very general statement of the Mis-
souri law concerning curtesy up to the last session of the
Missouri State Legislature. At that session the Act referred
to in the beginning abolishing curtesy and providing in lieu
thereof that widower shall have dower interest in his de-
ceased wife's real estate was passed. This Act approved
March 29,1921, reads as follows: "The estate which a widower
may have in the real estate of his deceased wife known as
'tenancy by the curtesy,' is hereby abolished, and in lieu there-
of the widower shall have the same share in the real estate of
his deceased wife that is provided by law for the widow in the
real estate of her deceased husband, with the same rights of
election and same limitations thereto; provided that nothing
contained in this Act.shall be so construed as to defeat any
estate by the curtesy which shalt have vested prior to the
date of taking effect of this act."
14. Brooks v. Barker, 228 S. W. 805.
15. Burris v. Page, 12 Mo. 368.
16. Ball v. Woolfolk. 176 Mo. 378.
17. McBreen v. McBreen, 154 Mo. 323.
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Considering this Act, the first thing presenting itself is
the difference between the two estates of curtesy and dower.
Curtesy is an estate for life in all the lands and tenements of
the wife, whereas dower is a life estate in one-third of the real
property of the husband (and also now of the wife). Again,
for curtesy to attach, issue must be born alive, capable of in-
heriting, but that is not necessary in order that dower attach.
This Act though apparently small and simple bids well to give
rise to many perplexing questions. With reference to the
subject of divorce as a bar it is found that a wife retains
dower in land of her husband if she is granted a divorce for
his fault."' Now that men have dower right may it not be said
in keeping with this decision that if a divorce is granted for
fault of wife the husband will still retain dower in her land.
If so, then one marked difference is set out for, according to
Doyle v. Rowling, cited below, when a husband obtains a
divorce from his wife for her fault, he no longer has curtesy
in her lands.' 9 In many cases the wife now owns her separ-
ate property free from curtesy. Particularly is this true
if the wife is doubtful of her husband signing the deed, pro-
vided she wished to make a conveyance. Under the new law
it is doubtful whether an arrangement such as above will bar
the husband's dower. If not, his signature must be obtained
when the wife wishes to make a conveyance. Previous to this
statute second husbands whose wives had children by the first
marriage but none by the second took no estate by the curtesy.
Now it may be that they will take dower. An interesting
question in connection with this subject is whether or not the
husband will take the valuable right of quarantine of dower,
which according to the law goes to the widow. Looking at
this question with no precedents as a guide it would seem that
there would be less need of the husband taking quarantine
right than the widow. At the husband's death the house in
which both he and wife have been living may be the only home
18. White Y. Ingram, 110 Mo. 474.
19. Doyle v. Rolwing. 165 Mo. 231.
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in which she has to live until the assignment of dower. At
the wife's death, in the majority of cases, there would seem
to be no need granting the husband the right to occupy the
principal mansion house, if such there be, upon the land of
the deceased wife for the reason that he may continue living
in his present home. However, if the view of dower is ap-
plied to men strictly as it has been to women, decisions may
hold that he is entitled to the quarantine right. A peculiar
question arises because of the fact that the present statute
giving a half to childless husbands was not repealed. Will
this result in allowing the husband a half under the old law
and the one-third, or dower interest, under the new? Does
the Act, declaring that the husband's dower shall be "in lieu
of" curtesy mean that it would only apply where curtesy
would otherwise exist? If so, the birth of a child alive, cap-
able of inheriting, would be necessary before the husband
would take dower. The Act states that it does not affect
"vested" curtesy rights. Since the words "initiate" and
"consummate" are not used, a question may arise as to
whether this means vested by the birth of children or vested
by the death of the wife. What are the rights of a husband
who obtained a divorce before 1921, but whose wife dies after
1921? By R. S. Mo. 1919, Sections 365-369, where the dower
of an insane wife is conveyed provision has to be made for her
support and notice published, etc. Now since men have dower
right will this procedure be necessary where the dower of an
insane husband is conveyed?
As time passes these and numerous other questions will
arise concerning the Act abolishing curtesy and giving in lieu
thereof dower. To presume how they will be decided would
be but mere guesswork productive of more harm than good.
It remains for their decision to be handed down by the Judge
or by twelve reasonably prudent men according to all the cir-
cmnstances in the case as each particular problem presents
itstlf. EVERETT R. VAuoH, '23.
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